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EVIDENCE - SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE - SPECTROGRAPHIC 
VOICE IDENTIFICATION HELD INADMISSIBLE PENDING 
THE GENERAL ACCEPTANCE OF THE TECHNIQUE BY THE 
SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY. REED v. STATE, 283 Md. 374, 391 
A.2d 364 (1978). 
In Reed v. State, 1 the Court of Appeals of Maryland held that 
spectrographic voice identification2 has not achieved general 
acceptance among the members of the relevant scientific community 
and is, therefore, inadmissible in a criminal tria1. 3 In so holding, the 
court of appeals declined to join the growing number of jurisdictions, 
albeit still the minority, that have admitted evidence of spectrogra-
phic analysis. 4 The court adopted the standard enunciated in Frye v. 
United States,S which requires that a scientific principle or technique 
"be sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs"6 before it is deemed to have 
crossed "the line between experimental and demonstrable stages," 
thereby allowing it to be admitted into evidence.7 With this holding, 
Reed became the first Maryland case to adopt the Frye standard for 
determination of the admissibility of scientific evidence.8 This 
1. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). 
2. The common name for this identification procedure is "voiceprint." Courts, 
however, have expressed disapproval of that name because it raises the specter 
of a fingerprint, thereby connoting an "absolute certainty and accuracy which is 
neither justified by the facts nor claimed by the experts in the field." United 
States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 465 n.1 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975). 
See generally Bolt, Cooper, David, Denes, Stevens & Pickett, Speaker Identifica· 
tion by Speech Spectrograms: A Scientists' View of its Reliability for Legal 
Purposes, 47 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'y AM. 597 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Bolt 
Report]. 
3. 283 Md. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377 (1978). 
4. It has been argued that there is a trend favoring the admissibility of this 
technique. This "trend" is the result of so-called "neutral" studies conducted by 
Dr. Oscar Tosi of Michigan State University, in conjunction with the Michigan 
State Police Department, which determined that spectrographic voice identifica-
tion was an accurate identifier of voices. See Black, Lashbrook, Nash, Oyer, 
Pedrey, Tosi & Truby, Reply to "Speaker Identification by Speech Spectrograms: 
Some Further Observations", 54 J. ACOUSTICAL SOC'y AM. 535 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Tosi Report]. The neutrality of the Tosi studies was challenged by the 
Supreme Court of Michigan in People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 257 N.W.2d 537 
(1977), wherein the court questioned the impartiality of Dr. Tosi, whose career 
was built upon "voiceprint" work. Id. at 539. Michigan refuses to admit 
spectrographic voice analysis into evidence. 
5. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (involving the exclusion of test results of a 
precursor to the polygraph test that measured deception by changes in the 
systolic blood pressure of the witness). 
6. Id. 
7. This standard has been extracted from dicta supplied by the Frye court. As that 
court explained: "Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between the experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. 
Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be 
recognized .... " Id. at 1014. 
8. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 400, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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casenote analyzes the Reed decision and presents an overview of 
judicial treatment of spectrographic voice identification to date. 
I. THE FACTS 
In 1974, a woman was raped and sexually assaulted in a wooded 
area adjacent to her home. The victim later received a telephone call 
from a man who identified himself as the assailant. The woman 
immediately notified the police, who subsequently installed a tape 
recording device on her telephone to record any future communica-
tions from the caller. During the next few days, the woman received 
eight calls from her professed assailant; each of these conversations 
was recorded. In one conversation, the woman, acting upon 
instructions from the police, offered to pay the caller $1,000.00 if he 
would stop harassing her, and arrangements were made to deposit 
the money in a specified locker in a bus station. The money was 
deposited in the locker at the designated time and, pursuant to the 
caller's instructions, a key to the locker was placed in a specified 
location. Reed was arrested by the police after he obtained the key 
and proceeded to the locker. He was subsequently indicted in 
Montgomery County Circuit Court for rape and other charges 
arising out of the same incident. 9 
During the course of its investigation, the Montgomery County 
State's Attorney's Office compelled Reed to provide voice exemplars 
by having Reed repeat, into a telephone connected to a recording 
device, the same words that had been spoken to the victim in the 
earlier, recorded telephone calls.lO These tapes, together with the 
tapes of the calls made by the professed assailant, were sent to the 
Voice Identification Unit of the Michigan State Policell where, after 
one inconclusive test, Reed was positively identified as the speaker 
in four of the seven telephone calls made to the victim.12 
A pretrial hearing was held pursuant to the defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence of voice identification based upon these 
spectographic analyses. This motion was denied, and during the 
course of the trial the State introduced expert testimony based on 
spectrographic analysis, establishing that the voice on the master 
9. Id. at 375-76, 391 A.2d at 365. 
10. Id. at 376, 391 A.2d at 365. The compelled production of voice exemplars does not 
violate the fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self·incrimination, 
because the exemplars are used solely for identification purposes, and not for the 
testimonial or communicative content of the utterances. United States v. 
Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973). 
11. The Michigan State Police force is considered the nationwide leader in the field 
of spectrographic voice analysis, primarily due to Dr. Tosi's initial study which 
was conducted in conjunction with that force. See note 4 supra. 
12. The remaining three calls were incapable of spectrographic analysis due to 
technical reasons. One call was too short to obtain a sufficient number of words 
on which an analysis could be done, one call was too distorted, and no voice 
exemplar had been obtained for the third. 283 Md. at 376 n.l, 391 A.2d at 365 n.1. 
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tape and the voice on the exemplars were the same. 13 The jury 
returned a verdict of guilty, and Reed appealed the judgment on the 
ground that the admission of the tapes as well as the expert 
testimony analyzing them was reversible error.14 The court of special 
appeals affirmed Reed's conviction. IS The Court of Appeals of 
Maryland subsequently granted certiorari and reversed Reed's 
conviction, holding that evidence based upon spectrographic voice 
analysis is inadmissible.ls 
II. SPECTROGRAPHIC VOICE IDENTIFICATION 
Proponents of spectrographic voice analysis premise their 
support of the technique on the theory that no two human voices are 
identicalP Because the vocal characteristics of anyone individual 
are the result of complex physiological and mechanical functions 
within the individual, it is highly improbable that two people would 
share identical vocal characteristics. IS This phenomenon has led 
13. Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472, 477, 372 A.2d 243, 248 (1977). The expert called by 
the state was Sgt. Lonnie Smrkovski of the Michigan State Police Voice 
Identification Unit. Smrkovski had qualified as an expert on voice identification 
in at least six states and had never been rejected as an expert in the field by a 
court. Id. at 477 n.7, 372 A.2d at 248 n.7 (1977). 
14. Reed appealed on several grounds: (1) whether the best evidence rule was 
violated when the court permitted a copy of the original tapes to be used for 
comparison purposes due to the loss of the original tape by the police, Id. at 484, 
372 A.2d at 252; (2) whether the police tap placed on the victim's phone was legal, 
Id. at 487, 372 A.2d at 253; (3) whether the victim should have been allowed to 
testify that she recognized the appellant's voice in a police station line·up 
conducted after his arrest and whether that identification was otherwise 
unreliable, Id. at 489, 372 A.2d at 254 (1977); (4) whether the appellant was 
wrongfully compelled to provide voice exemplars, Id. at 491, 372 A.2d at 255; (5) 
whether the trial court erred in admitting into evidence a telephone call made by 
the appellant to the complainant two days prior to his scheduled trial at a time 
when he was under indictment and his counsel was not present, Id. at 494, 372 
A.2d at 257. The court of special appeals answered all of these issues in the 
negative. The court of appeals, however, granted certiorari on two issues: viz. the 
admissibility of the spectrographic voice evidence, and the use of tape copies in 
violation of the best evidence rule. The Reed court never reached the best 
evidence issue because it reversed on the spectrographic voice analysis evidence. 
See 283 Md. 374, 377 n.2, 391 A.2d 364, 366 n.2. 
15. 35 Md. App. 472, 372 A.2d 243 (1977). 
16. 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978) 
17. See generally Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence - Out of the 
Frye Pan Into Admissibility, 26 AM. D.L. REv. 314, 318 (1977); Kersta, Speaker 
Recognition and Identification by Voiceprint, 40 CONN. B.J. 586, 589 (1966). But 
see Jones, Danger - Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 549, 550 (1973). 
18. An individual's speech is created by a complex mechanical and physiological 
operation. Air exhaled past the vocal cords causes them to vibrate and produce 
pressure waves that are then modified by the vocal cavities (throat, nose, and 
cavities formed in the mouth by the positioning of the tongue), and by 
articulators (lips, teeth, tongue, palate and jaw muscles). See generally Jones, 
Danger - Voiceprints Ahead, 11 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 549, 550 (1973). The 
interaction of these sound waves with both the articulators and the vocal cavities 
results in the production of human speech. See also A. MOENSSENS & F. INBAU, 
SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES, 564-86 (2d ed. 1978); 19 AM. JUR. 
PROOF OF FACTS, Spectrogram Voice Identification at 423-41 (1967). 
1979] Reed v. State 149 
many scientists to adhere to the belief that a voice, when properly 
analyzed, can be used to identify accurately an unknown speaker.19 
Notwithstanding this belief, scientists differ as to the proper 
technique for voice analysis.2"l 
A "spectrographic voice analysis" is a visual representation of 
human speech.21 Stated simply, a voice spectrograph machine 
transforms the human sound waves into their respective frequencies 
and plots these frequencies on electronically sensitive paper.22 A 
comparison of a spectrograph conducted on a known voice with a 
spectrograph of an unknown voice provides the basis for voice 
identification. If the frequencies of the two voices contain the 
requisite number of similarities, the proponents of the process claim 
that the two speakers are the same.23 The leading proponent among 
the scientific community today in the area of spectrographic voice 
analysis is Dr. Oscar Tosi. In 1969, Dr. Tosi, a professor of 
audiology, speech science, and physics at Michigan State Univer-
sity, undertook a two-year study of voice spectrograms as an 
19. See generally Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Evidence - Out of the 
Frye Pan Into Admissibility, 26 AM. D.L. REV. 314 (1977); Kersta, Speaker 
Recognition and Identification by Voiceprint, 40 CONN. B.J. 586 (1966). 
20. See Tosi Report, supra note 4. See also Bolt Report, supra note 2. 
21. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 414, 391 A.2d 364, 384 (1977) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
22. The sound spectrograph consists of four· basic parts: (1) a magnetic recording 
device, (2) a variable electronic filter, (3) a papercarrying drum that is coupled to 
the magnetic recording device, and (4) an electric stylus that marks the paper as 
the drum rotates. 
The magnetic recording device is used to record a short sample of speech. 
The duration of the speech sample corresponds to the time required for 
one revolution of the drum. Then the speech sample is played repeatedly 
in order to analyze its spectral contents. For each revolution of the drum, 
the variable electronic filter passes only a certain band of frequencies, 
and the energy in the frequency band activates the electric stylus so that 
a straight line of varying darkness is produced across the paper. The 
degree of darkness represents the varying amplitude of the speech signal 
at the specified time within the given frequency band. As the drum 
revolves, the variable electronic filter moves to higher and higher 
frequencies, and the electric stylus moves parallel to the axis of the 
drum. Thus a pattern of closely-spaced lines is generated on the paper. 
·This pattern, which is the spectrogram, has the dimensions offrequency, 
time and amplitude .. 
A SUMMARY OF THE REPORT TO THE LAw ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE 
ADMINISTRATION, VOICE IDENTIFICATION RESEARCH 6 (LEAA Grant 
# NI-7Q-004, Feb. 1972) [hereinafter referred to as LEAA Study]. 
23. Developed by Bell Laboratories during the Second World War in an effort to 
identify and "track" German radio operators in the European theater and 
thereby monitor troop movements, see Reed v. State, 35 Md. App. 472, 473, 372 
A.2d 243, 246 (1977), the spectrographic voice analysis technique was "redisco-
vered" in 1962 by Dr. Lawrence Kersta in response to the need of law 
enforcement agencies to identify telephone bomb threat callers. See generally 
Kamine, The Voiceprint Technique: Its Structure and Reliability, 6 SAN DIEGO L. 
REV. 213, 227 (1969); Decker & Handler, Voiceprint Identification Ev.idence -
Out of the Frye Pan and into Admissibility, 26 AM. D.L. REV. 314, 320 n.37 
(1977). A failure to duplicate forensic conditions, however, resulted in widespread 
criticism of Dr. Kersta's study. 
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identification tool, ultimately concluding that they are' reliable. 24 
Working in conjunction with the Michigan State Police, Tosi 
conducted his study of voice spectrographs in a more thorough and 
verifiable manner than earlier works in the field. This study 
provided empirical support for proponents of this identification 
technique,25 and soon resulted in greater judicial acceptance of the 
controversial voice spectrograph as a method of identification.26 
III. JUDICIAL TREATMENT 
Only one court of final appeal admitted spectrographic voice 
analysis prior to the completion of the Tosi study,27 In Wright u. 
United States,28 the United States Court of Military Appeals, in 
affirming the court martial conviction of James Wright for making 
obscene and threatening phone calls to two women, ruled that expert 
testimony based upon spectrographic voice analyses purporting to 
identify Wright's voice as the voice recorded by one of the victims29 
was admissible. In the opinion of the Wright court, the evidence was 
admissible because members of the court-martial board were 
permitted to listen to the tape recorded voice of the offender and 
could thereby judge for themselves the accuracy of the spectrogra-
phic evidence.a:J Presumably, the Wright court believed that any 
undue weight that a jury might ordinarily attach to this scientific 
evidence would be offset by its ability to compare the voices 
aurally. 31 
During this same period, civilian courts of final appeal took a 
more skeptical approach to the admission of spectrographic voice 
analysis.32 In 1971, however, after the completion of the Tosi 
study, the Supreme Court of Minnesota in State ex rel. Trimble u. 
24. See LEAA Study, supra note 22. 
25. Tosi's study indicated that his use of voice spectrographs yielded an error rate of 
approximately 6% false identifications, and approximately 12% false elimination. 
[d. at 14. False identification occurs when a match is not present but the 
examiner mistakenly believes there is one or a match is present but an examiner 
selects the wrong one. [d. at 10-11. False elimination occurs when an examiner 
fails to match voices when a voice is present. [d. 
26. Compare State v. Cary, 99 N.J. Super. 323, 239 A.2d 680, remanded for further 
testimony, 53 N.J. 256, 250 A.2d 15, aff'd, 56 N.J. 16, 264 A.2d 209 (1968) (voice 
spectrograph held inadmissible due to failure to attain general acceptance 
among experts in the field) with State ex rel. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 42, 
192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (voice spectrograph admitted into evidence on the grounds 
that difference of opinion in the scientific community goes to the weight, and not 
the admissibility of the evidence). 
27. United States v. Wright, 17 C.M.A. 183,37 C.M.R. 447 (1967). 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 189, 37 C.M.R. at 453. 
30. [d. "Voice identification of a person by human ear is a commonplace experience, 
and has long been recognized in the courts." [d. at 188, 37 C.M.R. at 453. 
31. [d. 
32. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 (1968) (admission 
of identification based on voiceprint held reversible error). 
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Hedman33 became the first civilian court to sustain the admissibility 
of spectrographic voice identification evidence. Although the 
evidence in that case was admitted for the purpose of establish-
ing probable cause to issue arrest and search warrants, the court, 
citing the testimony of Dr. Tosi, held that "in the trial of the case 
spectrograms ought to be admissible for the purpose of corroborating 
voice identification by aural means."34 According to the Trimble 
court, disagreement within the relevant scientific community does 
not, of itself, make the opinion of an expert in· that field 
inadmissible. "Where experts disagree," the court stated, "it is for 
the fact finder ... to determine which [expert opinion] is more 
credible and therefore more acceptable."35 Since Trimble, the 
majority of jurisdictions confronted with such evidence have held it 
admissible,36 albeit on different grounds.37 Additionally, it should be 
noted that many jurisdictions that have upheld the admissibility of 
spectrographic voice analysis have declined to decide whether such 
evidence is routinely admissible. 38 
33. 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971). 
34. [d. at 458, 192 N.W.2d at 44l. 
35. [d. at 456, 192 N.W.2d at 440. 
36. See United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 
1025 (1979); United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 
1019 (1975); United States v. Jenkins, 525 F.2d 819 (6th Cir. 1975); United States 
v. Sample, 378 F. Supp. 44 (E.D. Pa. 1974); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. App. 
1972); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978); Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 
Mass. 191,327 N.E.2d 671 (1975); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 
192 N.W.2d 432 (1971); People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228 (Sup. 
Ct 1976); State v. alderman, 44 Ohio App. 2d 130, 336 N.E.2d 442 (1975). 
37. See, e.g., United States v. Baller, 519 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.) (trial judge's 
discretion as to whether evidential value outweighs prejudicial harm was 
properly exercised in the admission of the spectrographic evidence), cert. denied, 
423 U.S. 1019 (1975); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613, 614 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) 
(evidence admissible to corroborate defendant's identification by other means); 
State v. Williams, 338 A.2d 500, 504 (Me. 1978) (the trial judge is given the 
discretion to admit scientific evidence which has not yet achieved the general 
acceptance in the relevant scientific community if the proffered evidence is 
sufficiently reliable to be held relevant); State ex rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 
Minn. 442, 450, 192 N.W.2d 432, 440 (1971) (difference of opinion in the scientific 
community goes to the weight and not to the admissibility of the evidence); 
People v. Rogers, 86 Misc. 2d 868, 385 N.Y.S.2d 228, 237 (1976) (spectrographic 
voice identification has been generally accepted by those scientists who would be 
expected to be familiar with its use). 
38. See, e.g., Hodo v. Superior Court, 30 Cal. App. 3d 780, 106 Cal. Rptr. 547 (1973) 
(spectrographic evidence was corroborative of other direct testimony inculpating 
the defendant); Alea v. State, 265 So. 2d 96 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) (additional 
evidence was present to corroborate the identity of the defendant as the one who 
committed the crime); Worley v. State, 263 So. 2d 613 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1972) 
(evidence against the defendant was already sufficient to convict him); State ex 
rei. Trimble v. Hedman, 291 Minn. 442, 192 N.W.2d 432 (1971) (spectrographic 
analysis admissible for purposes of establishing probable cause); State v. 
Andretta, 61 N.J. 544, 296 A.2d 644 (1972) (specifically declining to decide 
whether spectrographic analysis would be routinely admissible at trial). 
In Worley v. State, supra, a case in which the evidence against the defendant 
was already sufficient to convict him, the court stated that: 
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The debate over the proper standards for governing the 
admissibility of scientific evidence has divided the jurisdictions of 
this country. On one end of the spectrum are those jurisdictions that 
refuse to admit any scientific evidence until the technique has 
gained the general acceptance of the scientific community in which 
it belongs.39 This stricter standard of admissibility arose out of the 
case of Frye v. United States,40 which held inadmissible a precursor 
of the polygraph test:41 
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line 
between experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to 
define. Somewhere in this twilight zone the evidential force 
of the principle must be recognized, and while courts will go 
a long way in admitting expert testimony deduced from a 
well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the thing 
from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently 
established to have gained general acceptance in the 
particular field in which it belongs.42 
On the other end of the adinissibility spectrum are those 
jurisdictions that follow the guidelines established in Rule 702 of 
the Federal Rules of Evidence.43 Rule 702 allows the admission of 
any scientific evidence upon a showing of reliability and allows any 
dispute within the scientific community as to the accuracy of the 
process to go to the weight as opposed to the admissibility of the 
evidence.44 It is this more liberal view that has been propounded by 
Dean McCormick, who wrote that "any relevant conclusions which 
are supported by a qualified expert witness should be received unless 
[T]his decision must be limited by our facts. We hold voiceprints were 
properly admitted to corroborate the defendant's identification by other 
means .... [W]e do not decide if ... voiceprint identification, standing 
alone, would be sufficient to sustain the identification and conviction of 
the defendant. 
263 So. 2d at 614-15. See generally Greene, Voiceprint Identification: The Case in 
Favor of Admissibility, 13 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 171 (1975). 
39. See Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
40.Id. 
41. See note 5 supra. 
42. 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (emphasis added). 
43. The federal rule provides as follows: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier 
of fact to' understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a 
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, 
or education may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
FED. R. EVID.702. 
44. Id. See also United States v. Franks, 511 F.2d 25 (6th Cir. 1975); United States v. 
Stifel, 433 F.2d 431, 438 (6th Cir. 1970) (quoted in United States v. Baller, 519 
F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1019 (1975)); Reed v. State, 283 Md. 
374, 403, 391 A.2d 364, 379 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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there are other reasons for exclusion."45 The prevalent reason for 
exclusion in the jurisdictions applying this standard has been the 
failure of the probative value of the scientific evidence to exceed the 
prejudicial effect such evidence may have upon a jury.46 
A. The Reed Decision 
There are two basic premises underlying the majority's adoption 
of the Frye standard of admissibility. First, fairness to the defendant 
requires that before the results of a scientific process can be used 
against him, he is entitled to a scientific judgment on the reliability 
of the process.47 Second, because the scientific method in dispute 
must be one that is generally accepted within the relevant scientific 
community, the defendant will have a "minimal reserve" of experts 
who can critically examine the validity of the scientific determina-
tion in his particular case.48 
1. Fairness to the Defendant 
The Reed court maintained that the "apparent objectivity of the 
[spectrograph] machine may sl.lggest a degree of certainty inconsist-
ent with the subjective aspects of the enterprise."49 The majority 
feared that the admission of the scientific evidence, particularly 
when presented by experts, would cause a lay jury to attach an 
inordinate amount of weight to the evidence and to accept the 
spectrograph identification as infallible. 50 Notwithstanding the Reed 
trial judge's carefully worded instruction that the jury could either 
accept or reject an expert's opinion regarding spectrographs or 
assign to the opinion whatever weight it believed the opinion 
45. C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF EVIDENCE § 203, at 489 (2d ed. 1972) 
[hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK'S ]. " 'General scientific acceptance' is a proper 
condition for taking judicial notice of scientific facts, but not a criterion for the 
admissibility of scientific evidence." Id. 
46. A lie detector, or polygraph, test is a common example of this possible prejudicial 
effect. See, e.g., United States v. Alexander, 526 F.2d 161, 168 (8th Cir. 1975). But 
see United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 
1025 (1979); State v. Williams, 388 A.2d 500 (Me. 1978) (probative value of 
spectrographic voice analysis outweighs prejudicial effect). See generally Note, 
64 CORNELL L. REV. 875 (1979). 
47. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 386, 391 A.2d 364, 370 (1978). 
48. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 
(D.C. Cir. 1974». 
49. Id. at 385, 391 A.2d at 370. 
50.Id. 
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merited,51 the court of appeals found the charge inadequate.52 
Because a "misleading aura of certainty ... often envelops a new 
scientific process obscuring its currently experimental nature,"53 the 
court of appeals chose to exclude spectrographic evidence from the 
consideration of the jury.54 
In addition, the Reed court maintained that the Frye standard of 
admissibility would enhance the conduct of a trial by guaranteeing 
that each judgment be rendered on the merits of the litigation. 55 
Employing this standard, the court reasoned, would preclude each 
trial from degenerating into a trial of the scientific process 
involved. 56 Further, the Frye standard would guarantee a uniform 
result within the jurisdiction regarding the validity of a particular 
piece of scientific evidence. This would not be the case if each judge 
51. Id. at 492-93, 391 A.2d at 422-23. The instruction to the jury consisted of the 
following: 
Ladies and gentlemen, the rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit a 
witness to testify as to his opinions or conclusion. There are exceptions. I 
think in the course of this trial you have learned that even a person 
without prior experience or expertise, particular experience, training or 
expertise, is permitted by our law if they are familiar with a particular 
voice or have heard a particular voice, to express an opinion as to 
whether another voice is the same as or different from the other voice 
which they heard. But generally speaking, a witness is not allowed to 
express an opinion or a conclusion. An expert witness is an exception to 
this rule. 
A witness who by education and experience has become expert in 
any art, science or profession, may be permitted to state his opinion, as 
to a matter in which he is versed and which is material to the case. He 
may also state the reasons for that opinion. This testimony should be 
considered and weighed by you like any other evidence in the case and 
given the weight to which you deem the opinion to be entitled. 
You may reject the opinion if the facts upon which it is based have 
not been established to your satisfaction by the evidence, or if you are 
not satisfied with the reasons given in support of the opinion. Where 
expert witnesses disagree, it is for you to decide which one, if either, is to 
be believed. 
In this particular case, ladies and gentlemen, you have heard 
testimony pertaining to voice identification with the aid of spectrogra-
phic analysis. The same rules apply to that type of testimony as I just 
gave you. It is your function to weigh the testimony of the various 
witnesses when they are testifying in that area and to assign such 
weight at all, some weight, or much weight, as you find it to be entitled. 
52. Id. at 398-99, 391 A.2d at 377. 
53. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting People v. Kelly, 17 Cal. 3d 24, 31-32, 549 P.2d 
1240, 1245, 130 Cal. Rptr. 144, 149 (1976». 
54. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978). 
55. Id. at 388, 391 A.2d at 371. The majority wrote: 
56.Id. 
The introduction of evidence based on a scientific process, not yet 
generally accepted in the scientific community, is likely to distract the 
fact finder from its central concern, namely the rendition of a judgment 
on the merits of the litigation. Without the Frye test or something 
similar, the reliability of an experimental scientific technique is likely to 
become a central issue in each trial in which it is introduced, as long as 
there remains serious disagreement in the scientific community over its 
reliability. 
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or jury were permitted to determine that issue for itself. Under the 
Frye test, the court explained, all defendants will face the same 
burdens with regard to scientific techniques. 57 "If ... on the other 
hand," Judge Eldridge wrote on behalf of the court, "a novel 
scientific process does achieve general acceptance in the scientific 
community, there will likely be as little dispute over its reliability as 
there is now concerning other areas of forensic science which have 
been deemed admissible under the Frye standard, such as blood 
tests, ballistics tests, etc."58 
2. Minimal Reserve of Experts 
The second premise upon which the Reed court based its 
adoption of the Frye standard was the belief that Frye provides the 
defendant a greater opportunity to rebut spectrographic evidence 
with expert witnesses of his own. Frye requires that a scientific 
process attain general acceptance in the field in which it belongs 
before such evidence is admissible. 59 With a scientific process such 
as spectrographic voice identification, however, there is considerable 
controversy concerning the particular scientific field in which it 
should be placed.60 The trial court in Reed concluded that the Frye 
test requires general acceptance among the scientific group actually 
engaged in the use of spectrograph analysis and in the experimenta-
tion with the technique.61 That court specifically excluded from the 
relevant scientific community the broader aggregate of scientists 
engaged in the speech and hearing sciences, among whom, the court 
conceded, there probably was not acceptance of spectrographic voice 
analysis.62 The Reed majority rejected this approach and stated that 
there was no basis for eliminating from consideration "the opinions 
of those scientists in the field of speech and hearing, as well as 
related fields, who, by training and education, are competent to 
make professional judgments concerning experiments undertaken by 
others."63 The reasoning behind the majority's position is that the 
57. [d. 
58. [d. 
59. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (D.C. Cir. 1923). 
60. In his dissent, Judge Smith suggests that anyone with training in the field of 
physics would be a member of the "relevant scientific community." 283 Md. at 
495, 391 A.2d at 424. Several courts have defined the relevant scientific field as 
those scientists who would be acquainted with the use of the process involved. 
See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lykus, 367 Mass. 191, 196,327 N.E.2d 671, 677 (1975). 
Finally, at least one court has held that spectrographic voice analysis is not 
properly placed within anyone established category of science but rather 
requires a knowledge of anatomy, physiology, physics, psychology and 
linguistics. See, e.g., People v. King, 266 Cal. App. 2d 437, 72 Cal. Rptr. 478 
(1968). 
61. Joint Record Extract at 82, Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 391 A.2d 364 (1978). 
62. [d. at 83. 
63. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 399, 391 A.2d 364, 377 (1978). 
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defendant must be guaranteed a "minimal reserve of experts" to 
dispute the scientific process that is being used against him.64 
The need for this reserve of experts can best be illustrated by a 
hypothetical situation in which only one scientist had done work in 
a particular area of scientific development. Under the narrow 
interpretation of the Frye standard, as expounded by the Reed trial 
court, that scientific evidence would most certainly be admitted 
because of the defendant's inability to rebut the validity of the 
evidence presented for want of an expert of his own to testify. The 
court of appeals, however, would allow the defendant to oppose 
introduction of the scientific evidence through the use of scientific 
experts who are deemed competent to make a professional judgment 
regarding that evidence. Their failure to have worked directly with 
the process would be deemed irrelevant to the issue of their ability to 
refute the evidence.65 
The majority in Reed concluded that evidence adduced at the 
trial level indicated that spectrographic voice analysis had not been 
accorded the general acceptance of the relevant scientific community 
and was, therefore, inadmissible. This holding was due in part to 
testimony which indicated that, of the experts who had done work 
with spectrographic voice identification, fifteen were proponents of 
the process and five opposed it.66 Additionally, evidence was pre-
sented indicating that the Speech Communications Section of the 
Acoustical Society of America had voted unanimously against an 
endorsement of the reliability of the procedure.67 The majority did 
not rule out the possibility that spectrographic voice analysis 
evidence would be admissible in the future following a showing of 
general scientific acceptance of the technique, but concluded that 
such a showing was absent in this case.68 
64. Id. at 386, 391 A.2d at 370 (quoting United States v. Addison, 498 F.2d 741, 744 
(D.C. Cir. 1974». 
65. Of course, because of his failure to have worked directly with the process, the 
degree of expertise the witness has by virtue of his studies in a related area 
would be seriously considered by the trial judge in determining the admissibility 
of the evidence. The Reed dissent maintains that such a minimal reserve of 
experts is available, citing to the Practicing Law Institute's "Voiceprint Defense 
Package" which lists the witnesses available for the defense in spectrographic 
voice identification cases. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 497, 391 A.2d 364, 425 
(1978). According to testimony adduced at trial, the number of scientists who 
have actually worked with spectrographic voice analysis is approximately 
twenty. Id. at 393, 391 A.2d at 374. Of these, five are opposed to the process and 
fifteen are proponents. Id. Applying the trial court's standard of admissibility 
(which the dissent would adopt), the relevant scientific community is therefore 
twenty. Query: Is the limitation of five expert witnesses to be considered a 
"minimal reserve" of experts? 
66. Id. at 393, 391 A.2d at 374. 
67. Id. at 394, 391 A.2d at 374. 
68. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377. 
1979] Reed v. State 157 
B. The Reed Dissent 
In a 104-page opinion authored by Judge Smith and concurred in 
by Chief Judge Murphy and Judge Orth,69 the dissent maintained 
that spectrographic voice evidence should be deemed admissible as 
evidence in a criminal trial and that any dispute within the scientific 
community as to the technique's accuracy should go to the weight 
and not the admissibility of the evidence.7o Explaining that 
Maryland had never adopted a standard of admissibility similar to 
that employed in Frye,71 the dissent contended that the admission of 
expert testimony predicated upon a scientific technique is within the 
sound discretion of the trial COurt. 72 The Reed majority pointed out, 
however, that when expert testimony based on the application of 
new scientific techniques is involved, "prior to the admission of such 
testimony, it must be established that the particular scientific 
method is itself reliable."73 Arguing that spectrographic voice 
analyses meet this requirement, the dissent took issue with the 
majority's use of the Frye standard in determining reliability. 
Recalling that Frye dealt with the admissibility of a precursor of the 
polygraph test,74 Judge Smith contended that the more strict 
standard of admissibility established by that case was necessary 
only for that particular form of scientific evidence because a 
"polygraph examination embraces a number of complexities not 
present in the areas of fingerprint, handwriting, voice-print, 
ballistics and neutron activation analysis. These deal primarily with 
physical phenomena rather than psychological responses."75 The 
dissent concluded that such a strict standard is not necessary for the 
admission of spectrographic voice identification evidence. 76 
In support of his thesis, Judge Smith examined other scientific 
procedures dealing with "physical phenomena" and their respective 
treatment by various courts in this country.77 The dissent concluded 
that other jurisdictions have admitted scientific evidence despite a 
contemporaneous disagreement among the relevant scientific 
community as to its accuracy.78 Judge Smith cited as an example the 
admission of fingerprint identification evidence, which was first 
upheld by an illinois appellate court in 1911 upon the principle that 
"whatever tends to prove any material fact is relevant and 
competent."79 Judge Smith conceded, however, that the Court of 
69. [d. at 504, 391 A.2d at 428 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
70. [d. at 457, 391 A.2d at 406 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
71. [d. 
72. [d. at 452, 391 A.2d at 403 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
73. [d. at 380, 391 A.2d at 367. 
74. See note 5 supra. 
75. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 449, 391 A.2d 364, 401 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
76. [d. at 451, 391 A.2d at 402 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
77. [d. at 417-51, 391 A.2d at 386-402. 
78. [d. 
79. People v. Jennings, 252 Ill. 534, 549, 96 N.E. 1077, 1082 (1911). 
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Appeals of Maryland was not faced with the issue of admissibility 
until 1944, at which time the court took judicial notice of the process' 
infallibility.8J The Maryland court therefore was not then faced with 
the split among the relevant scientific community present in the 
Reed case. 81 Citing a 1902 opinion of Oliver Wendell Holmes,82 who 
was at that time Chief Judge of the Supreme Judicial Court of 
Massachusetts, the Reed dissent explained that the then-novel 
science of firearms identification was admitted into evidence on the 
theory that the jury could visually compare the markings on the test 
bullet and the expended bullet itself, thereby allowing it to make a 
decision as to the accuracy of the identification independent of 
expert testimony.83 The Maryland court first heard an appeal of the 
admission into evidence of ballistics identification in 1951 and by 
that time the science was concededly "well established."84 Once 
again, Maryland was not confronted with a difference of opinion 
among the scientific community as to the accuracy of the scientific 
evidence. Judge Smith explained that by the time the results of a 
blood test were at issue before an appellate court, there was no 
dispute as to the accuracy of the process itself.85 Citing to the 
Maryland case of Shanks v. State,86 however, the dissent stated that 
such blood tests have been held admissible as evidence even though 
the results ofthe tests were inconclusive.87 Unlike the spectrographic 
issue confronting the Reed court, however, the dispute in Shanks did 
not concern the reliability of the process itself, but rather was 
concerned with the probative value to be attached to the evidence 
when two persons had the same blood type.88 
The dissent concluded that jurors are not so easily swayed by 
scientific evidence as to warrant application of the Frye standard in 
cases involving spectrographic voice analysis.89 Citing Chief Judge 
Marbury's opinion for the court in Shanks/X) Judge Smith observed: 
"Judges and juries must be presumed to have average intelligence at 
least, and no assumption to the contrary can be made for the 
purpose of excluding otherwise admissible testimony."91 
80. Murphy v. State, 184 Md. 70, 85-86, 40 A.2d 239, 246 (1944). 
8l. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 274, 392-93, 391 A.2d 364, 373-74 (1978). 
82. Commonwealth v. Best, 180 Mass. 492, 62 N.E. 748 (1902). 
83. [d. at 495-96, 62 N.E. at 750. 
84. Edwards v. State, 198 Md. 132, 81 A.2d 631 (1951). 
85. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 430. 391 A.2d 364, 392 (1978) (Smith, J., dissenting). 
86. 185 Md. 437, 45 A.2d 85 (1945). 
87. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374, 432-33, 391 A.2d 364, 393 (1978) (Smith, J., 
dissenting). 
88. [d. 
89. [d. at 502, 391 A.2d at 427 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
90. 185 Md. at 449, 45 A.2d at 90. 
9l. 283 Md. at 502-03, 391 A.2d at 427-28 (Smith, J., dissenting). 
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C. The Significance of Reed 
Although Maryland courts have heretofore readily accepted the 
admissibility into evidence of other scientific techniques, it cannot 
be said that Reed necessarily represents a deviation from prior 
judicial treatment of such evidence. Reed was the first case in which 
the Maryland courts were confronted with determining the admissi-
bility of a scientific technique at a time when the technique in 
controversy was still in its formative years. In all prior cases, the 
scientific techniques at issue had been in use for decades before the 
question of their admissibility reached the Maryland courts. 
Foreshadowings of the Reed decision, however, can be found as 
far back as 1945 when, writing for the court of appeals in Shanks, 
Chief Judge Marbury stated, 
In the early cases evidence of the tests was not admitted, 
because the courts here were not convinced of their general 
acceptance and reliability .... Blood tests are now 
accepted everywhere, scientifically, as accurate .... 92 
It is evident that the Shanks court readily admitted the blood tests 
into evidence because of longstanding and widespread acceptance in 
other jurisdictions. It may be inferred from the Shanks court's 
acknowledgment that the tests were not admitted when the 
Maryland courts were not convinced of their general acceptance, 
however, that had blood tests not achieved the acceptance that they 
had by 1945, it is likely that the result in Shanks would have been 
different. 
Additionally, in more recent cases in which the Maryland courts 
have been confronted with determining the admissibility of novel 
scientific techniques into evidence in criminal cases, the courts have 
employed language and analysis indicating a predilection toward 
the Frye standard of admissibility. In 1976, in Smith v. State,93 the 
Court of Special Appeals of Maryland refused to allow the results of 
a psychological stress evaluation test into evidence, holding that 
such "tests have not yet attained sufficient scientific acceptance as 
an accurate and reliable means of ascertaining truth or deception."94 
In the earlier case of Rawlings v. State,95 the court of special appeals 
employed a similar analysis in excluding from evidence the results 
of a polygraph examination.96 
92. Shanks v. State, 185 Md. 437, 440, 45 A.2d 85, 86 (1945) (citations omitted). 
93. 31 Md. App. 106, 355 A.2d 527 (1976). 
94. [d. at 119-20, 355 A.2d at 535 (quoting State v. La Forest, 106 N.H. 159, 160, 207 
A.2d 429, 430 (1965». 
95. 7 Md. App. 611, 256 A.2d 704 (1969). 
96. [d. at 614-15, 256 A.2d at 706. 
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IV. CONCLUSION 
Although spectrographic voice analysis was greeted with initial 
skepticism, since the completion of Dr. Tosi's study97 courts have 
been increasingly willing to admit such evidence.98 Those jurisdic-
tions that have admitted the results of this scientific technique 
have almost uniformly applied the Frye standard of admissibility, 
but have defined the "relevant scientific community" more narrowly 
than did the majority in Reed.99 
In his dissent, Judge Smith concluded that after the majority's 
holding in Reed, no trial judge "in his right mind" would, in the 
future, allow the admission into evidence of spectrographic voice 
analyses. loo The Reed decision, however, does not preclude the 
admission into evidence of spectrographic voice analysis for all time 
but only until such time as the process achieves the general 
acceptance of the relevant scientific community. According to Reed, 
the relevant community includes both those scientists who have 
experimented with the spectrograph machines and those within the 
broader field of speech and hearing sciences. 101 With the proper 
standards now established by the Reed court, presumably trial 
judges in this state are capable of accurately polling this portion of 
the scientific community with regard to the accuracy of the 
technique. With the increased experimentation in the field of 
spectrographic evidence, combined with the narrow four-to-three 
decision of the Reed court and the new composition of the court of 
appeals,102 the future disposition of spectrographic evidence is far 
less certain than the Reed dissent would have us believe. 
Daniel R. Andersont 
97. See text accompanying notes 17-26 supra. 
98. See note 36 supra. 
Because an increasing number of jurisdictions have admitted this evidence, 
an argument can, and has, been made that there is a trend in favor of 
admissibility. Recent opinions denying admission of spectrographic voice 
evidence, however, suggest that there may not be a clear trend. See Brown v. 
United States, 384 A.2d 647, 650 (D.C. 1978) (trial court's admission of 
spectrographic evidence held as harmless error); People v. Tobey, 401 Mich. 141, 
148, 257 N.W.2d 537, 540 (1977) ("We conclude that ... voiceprint evidence has 
[not] achieved general scientific acceptance as a reliable identification device 
.... "); Commonwealth v. Topa, 471 Pa. 223-32, 369 A.2d 1277, 1282 (1977) 
("[V]oiceprint identification has not, as yet, been generally accepted by the 
scientific community concerned with acoustical science"). 
99. Notable exceptions are those cases cited in note 44 supra, wherein the balancing 
test employed in the Federal Rules of Evidence was adopted. 
100. Id. at 504, 391 A.2d at 428. 
101. Id. at 399, 391 A.2d at 377. 
102. Judge Davidson was appointed to the bench upon the death of Judge Levine. 
t Mr. Anderson received a J.D. from the School of Law in May of 1979, and was a 
staff member of the University of Baltimore Law Review throughout the 
publication of volume eight. This casenote, a product of his work while a member 
of the Law Review, was delayed in publication because of space limitations in 
prior issues. - ED. 
